But come Monday, they were not ready to do whatever it took to get there. In Sunday sermons, they have repeatedly declared their readiness to play a stronger role in international affairs. The Union and its members have not drawn the right lessons from previous challenges to Europe’s regional order. The EU27 can no longer afford to ignore the indisputable need to take more responsibility for their own security. It is precisely because we did not react sufficiently to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 that we now find ourselves in an even more difficult situation. The EU will have to deal with these crises (and future crises) simultaneously, rather than shift its attention from one to the next. We are in the age of permacrisis, and what is happening in the East will have interlinked repercussions across policy areas, in many cases aggravating the challenges already present. ![]() However we choose to frame it, there is a need for a decisive shift in how we approach defence and security in the EU, including the painful discussion on how to tackle its fragmented defence market.īut the implications go much further than this. European countries will have to make good on their promises within NATO, like increasing defence and security spending. This includes reversing previous trends and policies. It is now time to stand up to Russia’s and President Putin’s revisionist strategic choices. This watershed moment also implies that governments in some EU countries will have to communicate more clearly to their citizens that the appeasement logic has failed. This will have to include considerations of how its democracy and civil society can be protected if they are no longer able to operate on Ukrainian territory. There will also be a need to construct a convincing support package for Ukraine, politically and economically. This will not be an act of solidarity it will be in the enlightened interest of all EU countries. And those member states and particularly vulnerable segments of our societies that will suffer a high economic price must be financially supported. ![]() It has to be done, and citizens must be made to understand that there is no alternative. European leaders must engage with their citizens on this basic truth. The broader and stronger sanctions will be, the greater the effects on Moscow. In order to make a difference, EU countries will have to be ready to bear the costs. That is how sanctions work: to be credible, those who put the coercive measures in place must be willing to accept that this will have a negative effect on both sides. Sanctions will hurt Russia, but the nature of economic sanctions is that they will also hurt the EU and its member states. But the EU must be realistic: in the end, politics will prevail over economics in Russia. Starting with the end of Nord Stream 2, there must be painful sanctions that hit Russia where it hurts, particularly with respect to its ability to export energy and raw materials and the wealth of those close to the regime. This should by no means deflect the EU27 from taking decisive actions – on the contrary. Whatever is being put in place now will not deter Moscow, and it is highly questionable whether it will lead to a reversal of any of the territorial gains Russia has made or will make in the near future. Unfortunately, there is little the EU can do to stop Russia’s current military aggression in Ukraine. The Union and its members will have to react swiftly and decisively, setting strong markers at today’s emergency meeting of the European Council. ![]() It is also a watershed moment in European history and will test the EU and liberal democracy more generally. ![]() The war of aggression President Putin is waging against Ukraine, breaking international law and destabilising European security, is, first and foremost, a tragedy for the people of Ukraine.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |